ABSTRACT Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) support safety and comfortable driving through frequent information exchange among intelligent vehicles. As an open access environment, VANETs are vulnerable to security threats, such as electronic attack and privacy disclosure. In this paper, we propose a misbehavior detection mechanism based on a support vector machine (SVM) and Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) of evidence to resist false message attack and message suppression attack. The proposed mechanism includes data trust model and vehicle trust model. The data trust model uses an SVM-based classifier to detect false messages based on message content and vehicle attributes. The vehicle trust model consists of a local vehicle trust module and a trust authority (TA) vehicle trust module. The local vehicle trust module uses another SVM-based classifier to evaluate whether the vehicle is credible based on the behavior of the vehicle in terms of message propagation. Then, the TA vehicle trust module uses DST to aggregate multiple trust assessment reports about the same vehicle and derives a comprehensive trust value. Simulation results show that Gaussian kernel best fits our models compared with other functions. In addition, the true positive rate of our data trust model is higher than the model based on back propagation neural network. Moreover, our two models are more robust than basic majority voting, weighted voting, and Bayesian inference in terms of true positive rate under various scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
The explosive evolution of vehicular communication technology has made it possible to improve road traffic safety and transportation efficiency by deploying VANETs [1] . Intelligent and networking increase the frequency of information exchange between automobiles, external devices, and external networks, but the information security issues introduced have become increasingly severe [2] . False message attack and message suppression attack are two types of serious cyber-network communication security attacks [3] . False message attack can mislead users by spreading unfaithful messages. Message suppression attack can prevent users from learning safety events timely by hindering the propagation of messages. These attacks may result in the loss of some or all of the important information, causing disastrous consequences [4] .
Cryptographic-based security mechanisms can resist external attackers through identity-authorized authentication, but cannot defend against false message attack and message suppression attack launched by internal attackers [5] , [6] , [7] . Therefore, many researchers proposed misbehavior detection mechanisms. The research methods include data consistency testing [8] - [12] , reputation management [13] , [14] and collaborative assessment [15] - [21] . Data consistency testing relies on data redundancy to improve detection accuracy, but at the cost of time. Reputation management assumes that the higher the reputation of the vehicle, the more reliable the message disseminated. The method is simple, but in fact, vehicles with high reputation may also send false message occasionally. Collaborative assessment can solve the problem that vehicle itself has limited knowledge since vehicle has limited ability. However, some of the cooperative vehicles may not be trusted.
In this paper, to resist false message attack and message suppression attack, we propose a misbehavior detection mechanism for VANETs. The proposed mechanism includes a data trust model and a vehicle trust model consisting of a local vehicle trust module and a TA vehicle trust module. Specifically, efforts and contributions of this work are listed as follows.
• First, considering the SVM algorithm can effectively deal with binary nonlinear classification and has the advantages of high accuracy and robust performance, we propose a data trust model using a SVM-based classifier, which can effectively determine the authenticity of the alert message based on message content and vehicle attributes.
• Second, a local vehicle trust module is presented by using another SVM-based classifier, which explores the behavior of the vehicle in terms of message propagation to determine whether the vehicle is trustworthy and submits the trust report to the TA.
• Third, to reduce the interference of false and inaccurate trust reports from networks, a TA vehicle trust module based on DST is proposed, which aggregates trust reports and then obtains a comprehensive trust evaluation for the evaluated vehicle.
• Finally, simulation and detailed analysis are made to validate the proposed misbehavior detection mechanism. Results show that Gaussian kernel best fits our models compared with other functions. In addition, the True Positive Rate (TPR) of our data trust model is higher than the model based on Back Propagation Neural Network (BPNN). Moreover, our two models are more robust than basic majority voting (MV), majority voting (WV), and Bayesian inference (BI) in terms of True Positive Rate (TPR) under various scenarios. The organization of the rest of this paper as follows. In section II, we give the related work. In section III, we introduce the network structure, model, and theoretical knowledge of the proposed mechanism. In section IV and section V, the proposed data trust model and vehicle trust model is presented in detail respectively. Simulation experiments and performance analysis are then introduced in section VI. Finally, we draw conclusions in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we describe the most recent and relevant works on misbehavior detection in VANETs.
A. DATA CONSISTENCY TESTING BASED APPROACHES Data consistency testing determines whether the message is real by analyzing whether multiple messages are consistent [8] - [10] . Fogue et al. [8] proposed a cooperative neighbor position verification mechanism, which uses direct verification, crosschecking, and multipoint location verification. Soleymani et al. [9] used both distance and time to verify the location of sender, and adopted fog nodes as a facility to evaluate the level of accuracy of event's location. Vulimiri et al. [10] suggested determining whether the warning message is true by observing the behavior of the surrounding vehicles after receiving the traffic accident notification.
However, in most of the VANETs scenarios, it is difficult to obtain enough redundant information.
Considering the advantages of machine learning in data processing, regular pattern analysis, and behavior prediction, some scholars have proposed misbehavior detection mechanisms based on machine learning [9] , [10] .
Zhang et al. [11] proposed a message filter based on BPNN, taking into account the distance between the source vehicle and the location of the incident, the distance between the source vehicle and the receiving vehicle, the speed and reputation of the source vehicle, but did not consider message forwarding. In order to reduce the dependence on redundant data and describe a large number of types of traffic events, Liu et al. [12] proposed an adaptive and self-learning intrusion detection model by combing BPNN and SVM. However, they did not present the input feature in detail.
B. REPUTATION MANAGEMENT BASED APPROACHES
Reputation is public knowledge and represents the collective opinion about a vehicle [13] . It represents vehicle's long-term behavior characteristic, and then can predict vehicle behavior to a certain extent.
Wang et al. [13] proposed a reputation management schemes for pseudonym-enabled VANETs. They build service reputation to identify liars and feedback reputations to deal with tactical attackers. Haddadou et al. [14] proposed a job market-signaling scheme for incentive and trust management in VANETs. Vehicles get credit awards by performing network cooperation operations properly. This can both suppress self-propelled or malicious vehicles. However, they did not distinguish between messages in different application scenarios.
C. COLLABORATIVE ASSESSMENT BASED APPROACHES
Collaborative assessment uses the opinions of other vehicles to improve the assessment accuracy. The key problem is how to integrate opinions. Commonly used methods include MV, WV, BI, DST and neural network.
Majority voting mechanism bases on the assumption that the majority of vehicles are honest and reliable, and the majority wins [15] . Weighted voting quantitative the weight of each vote based on vehicle's attributes, such as location proximity and reputation, and then sum up all the votes [16] . By introducing a time attribute, attenuation mechanism, and feedback regulation mechanism of the historical record, the dynamic access service evaluation scheme proposed by Ning et al. [17] , which comprehensively considers the direct and indirect service quality evaluations, can cope with the interference and effect brought by the dynamic change of network topology and node instability. Rawat et al. [18] proposed a vehicle trust scheme based on Bayesian inference, but did not illustrate how to obtain prior probability and conditional probability. Toward over or slow speeding misbehavior, Wahab et al. [19] and El Khatib et al. [20] respectively introduced DST and artificial neural network (ANN) to aggregate cluster members' evaluations. Compared with DST, ANN can use previous experience to self-learn, which improves the detection rate and reduces the false positive rate. For the discarding packet behavior, Wahab et al. [21] proposed a SVM-based intelligent detection model for clustered VANETs.
III. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE
Here, we illustrate the network structure, mechanism model and theoretical knowledge adopted in this paper.
A. NETWORK STRUCTURE
We consider a typical VANETs structure, as shown in Fig. 1 , consisting intelligent vehicles, roadside units (RSUs) and TA. Vehicles can communicate with each other or RSUs over wireless communication. RSUs have more computing and storage capabilities than vehicles. RSUs can also communicate with each other. The TA, a server, has the highest administrative authority, and can communicate with RSUs over a secure channel.
B. MECHANISM MODEL
The model of our proposed mechanism is shown in Fig. 2 . It contains a data trust model for false message attack and a vehicle trust model for message suppression attack. For clarity, the main notations used throughout the rest of this paper are listed in Table I .
The data trust model constructs feature vector based on the content of the message and uses the SVM-based classifier to determine whether the message is trustworthy. If the message is authentic, the model will alert drivers and forward the message. If the message is not authentic, the model will send it to the TA. The vehicle trust model contains two important modules: a local vehicle trust module and a TA vehicle trust module. The local vehicle trust module constructs feature vector based on the behavior pattern of the evaluated vehicle, and evaluates whether it is authentic using an SVM-based classifier. The vehicle then sends the assessment report to the TA. The TA vehicle trust module integrates the assessment results of multiple vehicles based on the DST to obtain the comprehensive vehicle trust value.
Finally, the TA will refer to the results of the data trust model and the vehicle trust model, update the vehicle's reputation value, and, if necessary, withdraw the vehicle.
C. SVM
The SVM learning algorithm finds an optimal hyperplane that separates the data set into two categories with ''maximum interval''. Aiming at the nonlinear separation of the original sample space, kernel function is introduced to map the original data to the higher-dimensional feature space, which can make the sample linearly separable in the high-dimensional feature space.
The formal of the optimal hyperplane as:
where, w is normal vector determining the direction of the hyperplane; bis the distance between hyperplane and the origin; ξ i is the classifier deviation for sample data i. There are four main kernel functions used for SVM: linear, polynomial, Gaussian, and sigmoid. They are different in the calculation speed and accuracy. In most cases, the proper kernel function is unknown. In order to avoid over-fitting or under-fitting problems, this paper uses K -fold cross-validation to achieve parameter tuning when training the classifier.
To choose the favorable kernel function, we compare the performance of different kernel functions in terms of TPR, FPR, and ACC. These parameters are calculated by using (2) .
59862 VOLUME 6, 2018 where, TP is the number of true positive; FN is the number of false negative; FP is the number of false positive; TN is the number of true negative.
D. DST
In DST, the frame of discernment is a complete set consisting of incompatible basic propositions on a question. A, a subset of , is a proposition. The basic probability allocation (BPA) function as:
The belief value corresponding to proposition A is calculated by using (4) .
The plausibility value corresponding to proposition A is calculated by using (5) .
Belief represents supporting. Plausibility represents nonrefuting.
Assume that m 1 and m 2 are two different BPA. The combined belief value corresponding to A is calculated by using (6) .
where:
IV. DATA TRUST MODEL FOR FALSE MESSAGE ATTACK
The objective of the proposed data trust model is to evaluate whether the received safety alert message is trustworthy. It includes three important modules: message filtering, false message detection and post-processing.
A. MESSAGE FILTERING
The generated messages by vehicles is always of local relevance, i.e., the data sensed by vehicles have their own lifetime and tempo-spatial scopes [22] . Therefore, vehicles only need to care about their own related events. They should ignore outdated messages or messages about remote events to avoid unnecessary message processing. The validity period of message is related to the type of event. For example, the validity period of emergency electronic brake message is shorter than the validity period of the traffic accident notification. The time validity of message can be expressed as t − t < t, where t is the current time, t is the time of the event, and t is the validity period of the message.
The distance between the vehicle and the event location can be calculated based on the latitude and longitude coordinates of the GPS. Assuming that the latitude and longitude of the vehicle location is (Lng1, Lat1), and the latitude and longitude of the event location is(Lng2, Lat2). The distance D between them can be calculated by using (8) .
where r is the earth radius, and
where f (x) converts the latitude and longitude into radians.
B. FALSE MESSAGE DETECTION
For messages that are not discarded by the first module, this module will further evaluate their authenticity. This module first constructs a message feature vector, and then uses a SVM-based message classifier to determine the authenticity of the message. • Vehicle Type: Since human drives vehicles, the behavior of the vehicle is closely related to the owner. According to the identity of the vehicle owner, this paper classifies vehicles into three main categories: police cars, public service vehicles (such as buses and taxis) and private cars. Different types of vehicles have different authorities, and the credibility of the messages sent is different.
• Message Type:There are differences in the time validity and spatial validity of different safety message types. This paper considers four types of safety alert messages: Forward Collision Avoidance (FCA), Emergency Electronic Brake (EEB), Do Not Pass Warning (DNPW), and Post Crash Notification (PCN).
• Reputation: The TA computes reputation R e based on the type and historical behavior of vehicle, and transmits it to the vehicle via encryption. The hardware security module of the vehicle is responsible for receiving, updating, and storingR e . The vehicle itself can read but cannot tamper withR e . When sending messages, vehicles must attach R e to the message.
• Distance: In general, the further the vehicle is from the event site, the lower the accuracy of the message. Hence, we also adopted the distance between the sender of the message and the location of the event, and the distance between the sender of the message and the receiver of the message as the message characteristics. The distance can be calculated by using (8).
• Message Forwarding Status: When the alert message is forwarded, it indicates that there may be a vehicle, who has detected the message and considered the message authentic. In this case, the type and reputation of the forwarding vehicle can be used as message features to improve the probability of detection.
2) MESSAGE CLASSIFIER BASED ON SVM
The decision logic of the message classifier uses SVM. Let us define D = {(x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), . . . , (x m , y m )} to be the training sample set, m to be the number of samples, y i ∈ {−1, +1} being the class label such that -1 indicates an authentic message and +1 indicates a false message. This paper describes the performance of SVM-based message classifier with different kernel functions in section VI.
C. POST-PROCESSING
This module performs operation based on the classification result given by the SVM-based message classifier.
If vehicle V 1 determines the message from vehicle V 2 is valid, it prompts the driver to take safety emergency measures or directly controls own behavior. At the same time, vehicle V 1 will forward the message. Whereas, if vehicle V 1 determines that the message is false, it sends this evidence to the TA. Then, the TA verifies whether the evidence is true, and takes measure according to the result.
V. VEHICLE TRUST MODEL FOR MESSAGE SUPPRESSION ATTACK
The goal of the proposed vehicle trust model is to identify malicious vehicles that block message propagation. Comprehensively consider such factors as instantaneous communication among vehicles, low encounter probability, and subjectivity of trust, the vehicle trust model proposed in this paper includes a local vehicle trust module and a TA vehicle trust module.
Vehicles autonomously determine whether the neighboring vehicle is malicious based on the local vehicle trust module. The TA vehicle trust module is responsible for fusing together multiple trust reports on the same vehicle in presence of both trustworthy and untrustworthy reports.
A. LOCAL VEHICLE TRUST MODEL
This module observes the behavior of neighbor vehicles based on Watchdog technology, constructs vehicle behavior feature vector according to the observation, and then uses a SVM-based vehicle classifier to determine whether a neighbor vehicle is trustworthy.
1) BEHAVIOR FEATURE VECTOR
In terms of message distribution, we consider packet drop rate (PDR), packet delay forward rate (PDFR), packet modify rate (PMOR) and packet misroute rate (PMIR) to describe vehicle. These behavior indicators are calculated by using (10) .
where, N represents the total number of data packets; N dp represents the number of discarded data packets; N dy represents the number of delayed data packets; N mf represents the number of tampered data packets, and N mr represents the number of incorrectly routed data packets. In addition to these four behavior features, we also consider vehicle reputation R e . Then, the behavior feature vector as follows X = [PDR; PDFR; PMOR; PMIR; R e ].
2) VEHICLE CLASSIFIER BASED ON SVM
The decision logic for judging whether a vehicle is credible uses SVM with the vehicle's behavior feature vector as input. The value space of the output value is = {−1, +1} such that -1 indicates a credible vehicle and 1 indicates a malicious vehicle. For instance, given a training sample set D = {(x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), ..., (x n , y n )}, x i to be the vehicle's behavior feature, n to be the number of samples, and y i ∈ . By using kernel function κ (x, x i ), the training data are implicitly projected into a higher dimensional feature space. Finally, we find the decision function as:
where α i is the Lagrange multipliers, κ (x, x i ) represents the kernel function, and bis a learned constant. The vectors x i are support vectors and obtained from the training set by an optimization process. For vehicle classification, the decision is based on whether the value f (x) is above or below a threshold. This paper describes the performance of SVM-based vehicle classifier with different kernel functions in section VI. The vehicle will generate a trust report on the evaluated vehicle based on the classification result and send it to the TA. For example, if a vehicle A performs trust evaluation on its neighbors, then vehicle A generates a trust report as shown in Table II and sends it to TA secretly.
3) TA VEHICLE TRUST MODULE
For a vehicle in VANETs, each of its neighbor vehicles can monitor its behavior, and generates a trust report on it. Let us define {V 1 , V 2 , · · · , V k } to be the neighbor set of vehicle V n and define {O 1 , O 2 , · · · , O k } to be the trust report set onV n . However, there are false or inaccurate trust reports. In order to improve the accuracy of vehicle trust assessment, we used DST to aggregate multiple trust reports from different vehicles.
In our context, the frame of discernment contains two elements, namely = {T ,T }. T indicates that the vehicle is credible.T indicates that the vehicle is not credible. Hence, there are three propositions: propositionH = {T } representing that the evaluated vehicle is credible; proposition H = {T } representing that the evaluated vehicle is not credible; proposition U = {T ,T } representing that the evaluated vehicle is either credible or malicious.
Assume that the reputation value of V i is R e . If vehicle V i states that vehicle V n is credible, then the BPA of vehicle V i are: If vehicle V i states that vehicle V n is malicious, then the BPA of vehicle V i are:
If the TA receives ktrust reports on vehicle V n , the credibility of the vehicle V n is:
In this paper, we assume that if Bel(H ) > 0.5, the evaluated vehicle is credible, while if Bel(H ) > 0.5, the evaluated vehicle is malicious. In the second case, the TA will update the vehicle's reputation.
VI. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we explain the scenario and parameters used to perform our simulations. We present as well the simulation results. In terms of data trust model performance evaluation, we present the performance of SVM-based message classifier using different kernel functions as a first step and compare the optimal SVM-based message classifier against BPNN-based model [11] and basic MV, WV, and BI. For the performance evaluation of vehicle trust model, we present the performance of SVM-based local vehicle trust classifiers using different kernel functions, and then compare our proposed DST-based evidence fusion model against basic MV, WV, and BI.
A. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT AND PARAMETERS
We use Veins to couple SUMO and OMNeT++ to build simulation environment. The road network file used by SUMO is from Open Street Map database, as shown in Fig. 3 , which is a region near our school. The simulation section is the two long intersecting roads, and the area is approximately 2.5km×2.5km. The maximum number of vehicles is 600. The properties of the vehicles as follows: vehicle length is 4.5m; the minimum interval between vehicles is 2.5m; the maximum speed of travel is 60km/h; the acceleration is 2.6m/s 2 ; the deceleration is 4.5m/s 2 ; the car-following model is the Krauss model. The driver defect value is 0.5 and the lane change is the LC2013 model. 
B. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS FOR DATA TRUST MODEL
To train SVM-based message classifiers, we use the network simulator to generate 20,000 training sample data. The training sample data is recorded in a CSV file. Table III lists the message features contained in sample data. We normalized the sample data before training and testing.
1) KERNEL FUNCTION PERFORMANCE
In order to choose the kernel function that best fits our model, we apply the SVM on the sample data using four kernel functions (linear, polynomial, Gaussian, and sigmoid). To achieve parameter tuning of each kernel function, we use 5-fold cross validation. Table IV lists the performance of the four kernel functions. We can see that the classification performance of the linear kernel is significantly worse than the other three kernel functions, which indicates that it is difficult separate the sample in the original space. Whereas, Gaussian kernel has the best classification effect, so we choose Gaussian kernel as the kernel function of SVM-based message classifier.
2) COMPARISON WITH BPNN MODEL
Compared with the BPNN model, our proposed model has fewer model parameters and more abundant message features. In this part, we present a comparison between the Gaussian kernel-based SVM model and BPNN model. Fig. 4 shows that SVM model yields a better TPR in the case of insufficient sample data. From Fig. 5 , we remark that the SVM model always yields a better TPR no matter how many messages and has stronger generalization capability. These results show that the message features introduced in our solution are meaningful and can improve the detection rate for false messages. scenarios with different average reputation or percentage of malicious vehicle as shown in Figs. 6-9. In the four scenarios, we assume that the prior probability of BI is 0.01 and the normal vehicles generally have a high reputation between 0.5 and 1.0.
In Fig. 6 , when the percentage of malicious vehicles reaches 50%, the TPR of MV drops to zero. This is the case because MV is only affected by the percentage of malicious vehicles. While, WV is based on the number and the reputation of vehicles. Therefore, the TPR of WV will decrease with the increase in the reputation value or the percentage of malicious vehicles. We find from Fig. 6 that the TPR of WV begins to decrease rapidly when the percentage of malicious vehicles exceeds 60%. In Fig. 7 , the TPR of WV begins to decline when the percentage of malicious vehicles exceeds 40%. These results are consistent with the theory. For the TPR of BI, it decreases slowly in Fig. 6 , while falls rapidly in Fig. 7 . This is because although BI is also affected by the reputation or the percentage of malicious vehicles, in the probability derivation, the reputation is taken as the conditional probability and is the dominant factor of BI. From For the reputation is the dominant factor in BI, in Fig. 8 , the TPR of BI drops rapidly when the average reputation of malicious vehicle is 0.8. In Fig. 8 , the TPR of the MV and WV is stable, because when the percentage of malicious vehicles is small, malicious vehicles cannot account for voting advantages in terms of quantity or weight. In Fig. 9 , the MV completely fails because most vehicles are malicious, and the TPR of WV begins to decline when the average reputation value of malicious vehicles is 0.2 and is almost 0 when the average reputation value of malicious vehicles is 0.4. In both scenarios, the SVM has a higher TPR and is stable basically, which indicate that it is almost not affected by the percentage and reputation of malicious vehicles.
In summary, MV, WV, and BI decision logics are affected by the reputation or percentage of malicious vehicles in different level, because they rely on the identity attributes of the vehicle sending the message. The SVM solution proposed in this paper based on the event content and the vehicle status, can retain stable in all scenarios, and has a high detection rate, which can resist the collusion attack to some extent. In terms of complexity, although the process of training the SVM model has high time complexity and space complexity, the SVM model can be trained well when the vehicle leaves the factory, and the vehicle can update the training model when it is idle. For a well-trained SVM model, the time complexity of classifying messages according to message characteristics isO (1) , which meets the real-time requirements.
C. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS FOR VEHICLE TRUST MODEL 1) SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS FOR LOCAL VEHICLE TRUST MODULE
The local vehicle trust module uses SVM to determine whether vehicle is credible. To train SVM-based vehicle classifier, we use the network simulator to generate VOLUME 6, 2018 20,000 sample data, and record the sample data in a CSV file. Before training and testing, we normalize the sample data.
In order to choose the kernel function that best fits our model, we apply the SVM on the sample data using four kernel functions (linear, polynomial, Gaussian, and sigmoid). To achieve parameter tuning of each kernel function, we use 5-fold cross validation. Table V lists the performance of the four kernel functions. We can see that the Gaussian kernel has the best classification effect, so we choose Gaussian kernel as the kernel function of our SVM based vehicle classifier.
2) SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS FOR TA VEHICLE TRUST MODULE
To evaluate the performance of the TA vehicle trust module, we compared it with basic MV, WV, and BI in four scenarios with different reputation or percentage of malicious vehicles, shown in Figs. 10-13. In the four scenarios, we assume that the prior probability of BI is 0.8 and the normal vehicles generally have a high reputation between 0.5 and 1.0.
From Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 , we can see that the performance of DST and BI are better than MV and WV. In Fig. 10 , the TPR of BI is high and stable, which is consistent with the fact that BI is almost not affected by the percentage of malicious vehicles. While, the TPR of DST is equivalent to BI when the percentage of malicious vehicles does not exceed 70%, but the TPR of DST begins to decline when the percentage of malicious vehicles exceeds 70%. In Fig. 11 , the DST has the best performance when the percentage of malicious vehicles does not exceed 70%. When the percentage of malicious vehicles exceeds 70%, the performance of BI is slightly better than DST. In Fig. 12 , the TPRs of DST, MV, and WV are high, and the TPR of BI decreases significantly when the average reputation value of malicious vehicles exceeds 0.8. In Fig. 13 , the detection performance of DST and BI is obviously better than that of MV and WV. When the average reputation of malicious vehicles is between 0.3 and 0.7, the TPR of BI is higher than that of DST, and when the average reputation of malicious vehicles exceeds 0.7, the TPR of the two model is close.
In summary, generally speaking, the performance of DST and BI is significantly better than that of MV and WV. For DST, the effect of the percentage of malicious vehicles is greater than that of the average reputation of malicious vehicles. Hence, DST has the best performance in the case where malicious vehicles have a high average reputation, but the percentage of malicious vehicles is not very high.
For BI, the effect of the average reputation of malicious vehicles is greater than that of the percentage of malicious vehicles. Hence, BI is applicable to the situation that malicious vehicles have low average reputation, but the percentage of malicious vehicles is relatively high. However, BI relies heavily on the prior probability, and the inappropriate prior probability will have a significant impact on the detection performance. For example, if we change the prior probability in simulation from 0.8 to 0.95, the detection performance of BI decreases, as shown in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 . In addition, the prior probability of BI is unavailable. In fact, the network system periodically isolates or withdraws those nodes with low reputation. Therefore, the scenario that the average reputation of malicious vehicles is high and the percentage of malicious vehicles is not very high is more common. Then, the DST is more suitable to fuse trust reports in VANETs.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a misbehavior detection mechanism to counter false message attack and message suppression attack in VANETs. On false message detection, a data trust model is firstly proposed based on SVM focusing on message itself. The model's message feature vector contains information such as event descriptions and vehicle status. Simulation results show that Gaussian kernel function best fits our SVM based message classifier. We evaluate our proposed data trust model using several decision logics, namely BPNN, MV, WV, and BI. Simulation results show that our proposed data trust model has high detection rate and high generalization ability, and is almost not affected by the reputation and percentage of malicious vehicles. On message suppression detection, we propose a vehicle trust model focusing on the behavior of vehicles in terms of message transmission. The model consists of local vehicle trust module and TA vehicle trust module. Each vehicle uses SVM based local vehicle trust module to determine whether its neighbor vehicle is credible and sends the trust report to the TA. TA vehicle trust module uses DST to fuse multiple trust reports on the same vehicle. Simulation results show that Gaussian kernel function best fits our SVM based vehicle classifier. Compared with basic MV, WV, and BI, our proposed vehicle trust model is more suitable for VANETs.
However, there are numerous attack means in VANETs, and then the detection mechanism could be extended to resist other misbehavior, such as Sybil attack and DoS attack. Moreover, the design of the reputation system is an important and intricate issue. For instance, it is need to address tactical attacks such as self-promoting attacks and bad-mouthing attacks. In addition, owing to receive multiple trust reports, TA has to deal them, update vehicles' reputations and revoke malicious vehicles, which meet tremendous calculation pressure. It is worth investigating the performance in the future.
